Madison and Jefferson by Nancy Isenberg & Andrew Burstein

Author:Nancy Isenberg & Andrew Burstein [Isenberg, Nancy & Burstein, Andrew]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 1400067286
Publisher: Random House
Published: 2010-09-28T05:00:00+00:00

“River of Thieves”

Jefferson’s handling of the Tripolitan War has to be one of the most instructive episodes in early U.S. foreign policy. Often seen as a diversion, the administration’s conflict with the Barbary powers was actually central to Jefferson’s and Madison’s philosophy of statecraft. For both of them, the principle of neutrality was automatically coupled with an implied threat of commercial retaliation. But economic pressure could work only on nations such as France and England, where there was a considerable volume of trade; the same strategy was useless in dealing with smaller states that disrupted American commerce. Jefferson had concluded as early as the 1780s that in such situations brute force was the only option.28

The Barbary States of North Africa, which included Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco, had a long-established practice of attacking American ships in the Mediterranean. They demanded tribute—bribes to ward off assaults on American merchantmen—and when it seemed expedient, they took American sailors captive. Forced to do backbreaking slave labor, the prisoners were punished with the infamous bastinado, one hundred blows to the feet for even minor offenses. Angered when President Adams failed to pay tribute as expected, the bashaw of Tripoli (the word for “high official” comes from either Persian or Turkish) impulsively declared war on the United States just as Jefferson assumed office. Unwilling to continue the past policy of “tributes and humiliations,” Jefferson told Madison that only military force would stop “the eternal increase of demand from these pirates.”

After consulting with his cabinet, Jefferson decided to send a squadron to the Mediterranean. This initiated the Tripolitan War (1801–05), best described as a naval war of intimidation and harassment. The captain of the American squadron carried clear instructions: to fight any or all of the Barbary States if they should declare war; and to safeguard commerce and “chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their ships” wherever they might be found. The navy’s goal was to establish a blockade of Tripoli and protect American vessels at the lowest possible cost.29

Jefferson may have had qualms over the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, but he was little troubled by his unsanctioned use of military force in this instance. Did he possess the authority to go to war without first consulting Congress? Attorney General Levi Lincoln was the only member of his cabinet to urge caution. Both Gallatin and Madison eagerly endorsed an unmitigated show of force. Surprisingly, Congress put up little resistance to Jefferson’s naval war, granting him complete control over the Mediterranean operation in 1802. The following year Gallatin set up a special fund that the president could use at his discretion and without further congressional oversight. Jefferson never made a formal declaration of war and kept a tight rein over relations with the Barbary States until the day he left office.30

The war with Tripoli was not just about protecting American commerce; it was a statement to the world about American fortitude. In a letter to Secretary Madison, David Humphreys, U.S. consul in Spain, expressed his concurrence with a policy designed to “chastise that haughty but contemptible Power.

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